From austerity to indebtedness and back by Antoniades, Andreas
1 
 
From austerity to indebtedness and back 
ANDREAS ANTONIADES 
Austerity emerged (yet again) as a powerful ordering device in the unstable sociopolitical 
environment of the global economic crisis. Its effectiveness as an ordering device has been 
based on its commonsensical nature. The narrative of austerity offers a clear explanation 
about what went wrong (living beyond our means) and what needs to be done (government 
spending cuts to address the crisis generated by us living beyond our means). It is all about 
excess and payback. 
One research strategy to unpack austerity’s narrative is to tackle it head on. Either by 
analysing where the economic crisis came from (i.e. how private sector liabilities were 
transformed into public debt) or by examining austerity policies’ dismal historical record in 
exacerbating poverty, and wealth and income inequalities, as documented by Mark Blyth in 
his book Austerity: A History of a Dangerous Idea. In this brief piece, I am following a 
different strategy. I highlight the excess targeted by the austerity narrative, and examine why 
and how it was generated in the first place. In doing so, I hope to illustrate that this excess 
does not signify a deviation or an exemption from the ‘normal’ mode of operation of our 
socioeconomic system. Rather this excess constitutes a defining element and precondition for 
the functioning of our economies and societies. In this context, austerity can only be a 
temporary fix (a redistribution mechanisms) that does not touch upon the causes of the 
problem. Therefore, no matter how hard and how often belts will be tightened, the problem of 
excess, or to use more concrete language, the problem of debt, will keep coming stronger and 
stronger, crisis after crisis. 
Leaving aside theories on what generates debt and indebtedness, it is well-documented that 
the rise of financial capitalism from the mid-1980s onwards marks a period in the history of 
global economy where we have seen a steady decline of labour’s contribution to GDP, or to 
put it more generally, a decline of households’ income especially in the most financialised 
economies. How was this problem (of diminishing aggregate demand) addressed? Through 
credit expansion. So long as ‘real money’ was not available in the quantities needed to sustain 
the living standards and consumption needs of our consumer societies, plastic/virtual money 
emerged to keep the existing socioeconomic system afloat. Whether this was a spontaneous 
response or a calculated and managed development is beside the point here. What is 
important is that through these processes credit/debt became the new money, the main ‘new 
currency’. What were the implications of this change? The lives of large parts of the global 
population were monetised and entered a new economic regime of governance dominated by 
creditor-debtor relationships. Also, during this period global debt levels (public and private) 
and inequality got out of control. 
If the raising of debt as ‘new money’ constitutes a systemic transformation, rather than an act 
of irresponsibility and profligacy by borrowers and lenders, then two important questions 
need to be asked: what has been driving this transformation and where has debt as ‘new 
money’ come from? Here we need to bring into the picture the issue of economic growth. 
Critical economic authors usually cast the relationship between debt and growth in the 
following terms. Increasing levels of debt necessitate increased rates of growth to reduce 
these debt levels (for debt is calculated as a percentage of GDP). But increasing growth rates 
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leads to higher credit and debt levels, which necessitate yet again faster growth, a vicious 
cycle that leads to economic collapse. This analysis is of course correct. But it would be a 
mistake to reduce the thirst for growth to the ‘debt drive’ of the modern economies. It seems 
to me that along with the ‘debt drive’ that dominates our financialised economies, there is 
also, independent of debt, a ‘growth drive’. Our numbers/statistics, our political and 
economic institutions, our minds and predispositions, our debt sustainability models are fixed 
on growth as the main measure of economic sustainability and success. This old problem 
with our obsession with growth is as relevant today as ever, and so long as the ‘growth drive’ 
governs unchallenged in our societies and mindsets, it will be really difficult to escape the 
current ‘debt trap’. 
Yet, an important set of question remains. How has all this new money been created and at 
what cost? Were there any credible alternatives? These questions lead us to the phenomenon 
of the privatisation of ‘money creation’ that gradually came to dominate advanced economies 
from the 1980s onwards and which spread internationally through structural adjustment 
programmes. The numbers are staggering here too. For instance, approximately 97% of the 
money currently in circulation in the UK is credit money that has been created by private 
banks, rather than the Bank of England. And the way in which this money has been created is 
by lending to households and corporations (i.e. by debt creation). Or to give another means of 
comparison, in the US the amount of interest paid by US citizens each year since 1978 has 
exceeded the amount of money paid by citizens in federal taxes. Therefore, we cannot 
understand and deal with how our debt societies function without understanding and dealing 
with the way in which money is created today (for recent insightful research 
see BoE and NEF). 
The austerity narrative erases all these systemic transformations – the rise of debt as last 
resort new money, the growth fixation as a key systemic driver for debt generation, and the 
privatisation of money creation as the key mechanism through which these transformations 
were materialised – and rather focuses on debt creation as an abnormality and a one-off 
problem. This is despite the fact that all evidence points to the opposite direction. For 
example, in the US, all categories of household debt are already back on the rise, while 
student loan debt has become the largest category of household debt after mortgages (total 
outstanding student loan debt was $1.26 trillion in the first quarter of 2016). Similarly, in the 
UK the household debt-to-income ratio has started to rise again, and household debt is 
projected to exceed 160% of household disposable income by the end of 2020, thus 
approaching its 2007/2008 highs (see page 70 of the latest OBS). Furthermore, according to 
a 2016 Sutton Trust report, students in England are now more indebted in comparison to their 
US counterparts after graduation, facing debts of over £44,000 at graduation compared to 
£29,000 for graduates of US private for-profit universities. And at a global level debt has 
increased by $57 trillion since 2007 and no major economy has decreased its total debt to 
GDP ratio, as pointed out by the 2015 McKinsey Global Institute report. 
This brings us to our last point/question. How can we change our debt based socioeconomic 
system? How can we undo life in debt? If the above analysis is (at least partly) correct then 
intervention needs to take place in at, at least, two areas. The first one is the area of the 
‘growth drive’. The second is ‘money creation’. Of course challenges and changes in these 
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areas require challenges and changes in the broader valorisation and knowledge/epistemic 
systems on which these areas are based. 
Moving from a growth-driven model of political economy to a different model is not easy 
and will take time (unless mediated by a socio-environmental catastrophe). But small steps 
can generate large-scale ruptures and changes. For instance, reassessing what we count as 
growth and GDP is paramount. Changes have been happening in this regard. At the end of 
2014, ONS included in the UK GDP two new ‘items’: money made by illegal drugs (approx. 
£6.7 billion) and prostitution (approx. £4.3 billion). The question then arises, is this the best 
we can do in redefining GDP? We certainly need to keep pushing for bringing ‘what counts 
as GDP’ closer to ‘what counts to us’, what we value as a society. In this context the 
introduction by ONS of a new survey and statistical series that aim to capture aspects of the 
‘quality of life’ beyond GDPis a positive step. But again much more need to be done both in 
terms of methodology and in ways of mainstreaming alternative measurements. As feminist 
economists have long argued, changes in what we count as GDP and how we measure well-
being are not about numbers but about defining and designing appropriate socioeconomic 
strategies for a better future. 
The second area of intervention refers to the existing regime of ‘money creation’. The 
existing system of privatised money creation has produced immense instability; after being 
bailed out by taxpayers, it has taken the banks that were ‘too big to fail’ in 2008 and made 
them bigger and has led to socially destabilising inequality. Thus, unless we start discussing 
and redesigning the principles of our monetary system, the causes of indebtedness of our 
financialised societies cannot be effectively addressed. 
To conclude, thinking that the debt conundrum of our societies can be addressed through 
austerity is naïve and dangerous. Austerity exacerbates the problem of indebtedness, without 
addressing any of its root causes. 
 
